Moral Preferentialism &
The Moral Burden of Proof

Written by Anthony David Vernon

One may prefer to put aside their preference for another, but then that would be their greater preference. Preference is difficult to pin down definitionally despite being known phenomenologically. Preferences are not inherently myopic, myriad factors shape subjectivity, we take a Buddhistic stance that islands of will do not exist and do not explain the moral universe. Or in other words preference is internal, but is not sheerly a matter of pure ego, and this is as far as we can go linguistically.
   Language is always burdened by definitions, in that definitional thinking never captures the contingencies or fuzziness of words. Yet, some necessary clarity of terminology will serve utility, even if usability does not always equate to exactitude. Here it must be understood that preferences aren’t mere desires but a confluence of desires and influences, both internal along with external. But our preferences are attached to subjects, given this when discussing moral subjectivism I will be thinking of moral subjectivism as moral preferentialism which argues ethical stances come from tastes, desires, influences, emotions, and other interpersonal along with intrapersonal matters all at once. It is subjects who also engage with moral objects, here moral objects will be equated to moral statements, yet moral objects beyond moral statements may exist. And here now we can establish moral objects including but not limited to: the moral burden of proof is on moral subjectivists and not moral objectivists.
   Moral subjectivists think that when they are placing the moral burden of proof onto their opponents, they are like the atheists who place the burden of proof of God onto the theist. While burdening may be valid for the atheist, moral subjectivists may be invalid in placing the moral burden of proof onto moral objectivists. Instead, the moral subjectivist might show that it is the case that morals and ethics are a matter of subjective relations.
   Some objectivists may lump in error theorists with moral subjectivists, but the subjectivist does agree that moral claims are in and of themselves something real. Yet, the moral subjectivist relates the reality of morality to conditional preference. This places moral subjectivity in the realm of sociology. But these claims make at least three possible leading assertions:

1. Moral subjectivity is based on a sort of realist error theory.

2. Morals are a real component of certain facts

3. Morals are not universal but found in individual and social circumstances.

   We can witness via sociology that people do not project matching moral claims, and many moral objectivists would likely agree. The moral objectivist is not denying that there is a subject in ethics or morals. Rather, it is moral subjectivist who denies that there is an object of ethics and morals isolated from our being both individually and socially. To be poorly Kantian, we can see moral objects in moral claims in and of themselves, including in expressivist claims. A moral object is not necessarily a universal moral claim, but at least any moral statement. However, then the subjectivist may follow with questions to moral objectivists such as if moral claims hold any universalizability, or go about the Zhuangzi argument of how we might begin to measure what is good or bad definitively. However, this is a shifting of the goal posts, and perhaps a valid shifting; yet, referring to prior statements, the moral subjectivist must still argue for the subjectivity of moral objects to counter all forms of moral objectivity.
   So, while it may be the case that there are no universalize-able moral objects or no way of measuring the outright contents of moral objects, there are nonetheless moral objects that can be applied to certain contextual ends. Here we potentially end up with a muddled virtue ethics or a subjectivism that requires objects, which may be no problem at all logically, especially under contingent and fuzzy logic. This could still, for the subjectivist, show that ethics and morals are based on contextual preference; but is this truly moral subjectivism if the given subjectivism is bound to moral objects of a any sort?
   It could be argued that denying moral objects is akin to stating that the earth is flat: all the phenomenal evidence points to the existence of moral objects as people make moral statements. What then is not understood is how moral objects fundamentally behave, like Democritus’ assertion of the atom. Like Democritus, our thinking, reasoning, and form of the matter may be well off. With that considered, even if begging the question, we have already gestured at moral objects as a thing sheerly within moral statements themselves. Yet, still for many moral objectivists we have no means of knowing which moral statements are good unless we try them out. This would drag ethics into a Jamesian ethical pragmatism in the hope of finding good moral objects, suggesting that there is a moral object as good as the world is round.
   Even without a moral object that we can surely show as being good, moral objects can still be the demonstrable case, if again we take moral statements as having an objective existence, such as in phenomenal responses to moral statements; take for example a child who stops stealing after being scolded by their mother. We need not have an exact atomic understanding of morals to pragmatically, evidently, and socially witness moral objects. The subjectivist, if they agree with this statement, has abandoned outright subjectivism, but could still ask which moral objects a subject takes on by choice, circumstance, and or both. Here, we have a few assumptions:

1. Subjects are compatibilist beings.

2. Subjects can access moral objects.

   I will not address if rationality belongs to the species or an individualized holding of certain qualities. What is observed is that not everyone plays with the same moral objects and that these moral objects have different qualities, at least by definition and very likely by application. For example, the statements ‘please don’t take any books’ and ‘you will have your hand sliced off if you take any books’ both discourage book stealing, but have very different weights to them including in enforcement.
   Yet, can we call any moral object universally good for all subjects in all contexts? What we may end up with is contextually good moral objects for any number of subjects. What good is the Golden Rule to a sadomasochist? Then again, can we really have our own personal Jesus? But this is not the burden at hand; there is Jesus and there are understandings of Jesus. Likewise, there are moral objects and understandings of those objects. We may be able or unable to idealize which moral objects correspond to the moral universe just like how we may be at a loss to finding the ultimate understanding of Christ. Instead, what we have in this wonky formulation are moral objects that are prior to evaluation.
   For an ethic to be truly or fully subjective, subjects would never refer to a priori moral objects. It is the burden of the subjectivist to show that all moral objects are a posteriori from personal and social logics. If a single moral object is a priori then morality does not stem from subjects and thus moral preference would be a reactive chain. The moral subjectivist must show that morality was sociological invention and not just pass the burden of proof. Subjectivists are making a positive claim, unlike the atheist who is not making an affirmative statement. If there are moral objects independent of sociological existence, then perhaps we are all objectivists of different kinds. The burden here is in figuring if subjects create moral objects or if moral objects come before subjective understandings of morality. Above all else, I wish to highlight an issue that many moral subjectivists fail to consider, that they have their own moral burden of proof.

About the Author

Anthony David Vernon is a paddle boarder and a philosopher at times.

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